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Chapter 2
SEX, SEXISM & THE NEW DEMONOLOGY
When an influenza epidemic strikes, the warnings of experts confirm what we know already: 
there’s a lot of it about. But to the average layperson, the current child sexual abuse epidemic 
is a mystery. Experts say it is widespread, but even with the benefit of that knowledge most 
of us recognise it only rarely in our midst. Our plight is one with which laypeople of the 16th 
and 17th centuries would sympathise.
Detailed analyses of the great witchhunts in Scotland and Germany reveal that they 
were not spontaneous movements of the people to which the authorities felt obliged to 
respond. Witch-hunting crises were preceded by official expressions of anxiety about the 
prevalence of witchcraft and the dangers it posed. Through the promotion of  witch-fear, 
ambitious rulers consolidated their power by feeding the flames of panic; priests and clerics 
enhanced their authority by demonstrating a newfound expertise in the diagnosis of 
witchcraft. Laypeople were often sceptical of the experts’ more extravagant claims and many 
tracts critical of the witchhunts were published. However, most people accepted that 
witchcraft was a great danger to society, and because they accepted the general truth of the 
theory they could not effectively challenge its more learned interpreters. Besides, those who 
did question the authorities were often denounced as witches themselves.1 
During the height of the witch-panic, as increasing numbers of ordinary women (and 
a few men) were sent to the stake, all but the most outspoken critics fell silent and many 
discontented common-folk seized the opportunity to make frivolous and vindictive 
accusations against people they disliked without fear of repercussions. The history of the 
late-20th century sexual abuse scare shows a similar pattern.
It began in the 1970s, when a clamour of competing social movements, each with its own 
agenda and each with its own moral entrepreneurs, vied for public and political attention. 
Then, in the early ‘80s, three major social streams - feminism, religious conservatism and the 
child protection movement - joined forces under the banner of combatting child sexual abuse.
The resulting coalition surged through the ‘80s and beyond, gathering size and power along 
the way, sweeping over, around or away most of the obstacles in its path. To understand how 
that coalition was formed, we need to revisit the ‘70s.
In this review, special attention will be paid to the moral entrepreneurs of the times and the 
beliefs they promoted. While it is true that social movements are nothing without their 
followers, for the most part followers simply follow. They believe - or go along with - 
whatever the rest of the group believes. Constructing a theoretical foundation for those 
beliefs is left primarily to the group’s leaders. Leaders also define objectives, determine the 
means of achieving them and promote the group’s beliefs to the wider community. Compared
to followers, leaders tend to be more intense in their ambitions, more certain of their 
convictions and more willing to make sacrifices for the cause. Followers may not fully 
support the beliefs and actions of their leaders, and members of the wider community may be 
frankly sceptical. But, when confronted with the impassioned rhetoric of energetic, 
committed and persistent moral entrepreneurs, most people appreciate the price of peace in 
their personal lives and, with varying degrees of willingness, they are prepared to pay it.
This emphasis on the leader’s role is not intended to let followers off the hook. It is a 
little simplistic but not untrue to suggest that throughout history charismatic zealots have 
taken out their personal problems on the world when given half a chance. When such leaders 
acquire power in a democracy, those who follow without question, and those who fail to 
voice their questions, must be as responsible for any resulting injustices as the single-minded 
and zealous leaders themselves.
I
The Strands of the Seventies
Throughout the Western world, the primary goal of ‘70s feminism was to free women from 
male oppression (and especially from the oppression of white, middle-class men). The 
agenda ranged from the evolutionary (equal pay, quality childcare, safe contraception, 
liberalised abortion and the abolition of sex-role stereotypes), to the revolutionary (female 
separatism, goddess worship, the abolition of the patriarchal family and the overthrow of 
patriarchal society). To evolutionary feminists the problem was sexism; to revolutionary 
feminists the problem was men.2 
The first New Zealand women’s liberation groups were formed in 1970. In the 
following years consciousness-raising groups, study groups and activist groups sprang up 
nationwide. Media coverage, though often patronising and hostile, was extensive. The public 
was left in no doubt: women were on the move.3 
As the decade progressed many feminist groups became established national organisations.4 
Rape crisis centres, women’s refuges and women’s studies courses proliferated. In 1972, 200 
women attended the National Women’s Liberation Conference in Wellington. United 
Women’s Conventions, held in other cities in 1973, 1975, 1977 and 1979, drew over 1000 
participants each. 
The New Zealand government was not immune to women’s concerns. During the ‘70s
the Equal Pay Act, the Matrimonial Property Act and the Human Rights Act (all of which 
outlawed discrimination against women) were passed. The Domestic Purposes Benefit (for 
the support of solo parents) was introduced, a state-run accident compensation scheme that 
covered non-earners was launched and the state-run national superannuation scheme was 
revised to give greater independence to married women.
Initially, women’s liberation was for all women, and for men as well. Broadsheet 
magazine, which first appeared in 1972, was always primarily by, for and about women, but, 
during its first few years, articles by men appeared regularly. ‘Don’t put men down’, wrote a 
correspondent. ‘Ask them to join the fight.’5 Conservative women, and a scattering of men, 
rubbed shoulders with feminists at early United Women’s Conventions. A representative of 
the Catholic Women’s League told the first United Women’s Convention: ‘The true way to 
happiness is to make Christ our guide and our friend’. The men present were said to be 
‘largely unobtrusive and reasonably supportive’. 
As the ‘70s progressed, women at the cutting edge of feminism became increasingly 
radicalised and United Women’s Conventions became increasingly disunited. By the end of 
the decade the inclusiveness had vanished. Conservative women turned their backs on the 
movement, women who saw themselves as moderates distanced themselves from women 
they saw as extremists and feminists at the core of the movement dissipated much of their 
energy on in-group upheavals over sexual politics, race and social class.6 
A cornerstone of the radicalisation of the women’s movement was the feminist analysis of 
rape. In October 1975, Broadsheet readers were told: ‘...rape is part of a normal pattern of 
male behaviour. Males in this society are conditioned from birth to be sexual aggressors 
while females are conditioned to be passive and submissive - perfect victims ... Every male is
a potential rapist.’7
The statement ‘every male is a potential rapist’ (which soon became the graffiti 
slogan ‘All men are rapists’) fits the definition of a stereotype in Gordon Allport’s The 
Nature of Prejudice: ‘Whether favourable or unfavourable, a stereotype is an exaggerated 
belief associated with a category. Its function is to justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation
to that category.’8
Category formation is an inevitable part of human existence. The business of life 
goes on with less effort if we stick with our own kind. The problem comes when loyalty to a 
category (the in-group - commonly united by nationality, race, ethnicity, gender or sexual 
orientation) leads to hostility to other categories (out-groups). The process is not inevitable; 
loyalty to New Zealand does not automatically mean hostility to China. It’s the negative 
stereotypes that cause the trouble. 
Writing in the ‘50s, Allport observed that negative stereotypes, which may or may not
originate in a kernel of truth, were used to justify hate-prejudice against Jews (who were 
believed to be clever, deceitful, overambitious and sly), Negroes (who were believed to be 
lecherous, lazy, filthy and aggressive) and women (who were believed to be hysterical, vain, 
irrational and intellectually deficient). A category not specifically considered by Allport was 
homosexuals (who were believed to be sick, degenerate, sex-mad, corrupters of youth). 
Allport noted that most stereotypes reflect the human tendency to attribute to others the 
weaknesses we most despise in ourselves. 
Another major figure of Allport’s era was psychologist Theodor Adorno who 
identified a cluster of character traits in prejudiced people, which, taken together, constituted 
‘the authoritarian personality’ (though recent studies suggest that authoritarianism is not so 
much a personality type as a reflection of the values and norms of the sub-groups to which 
prejudiced people belong). In addition to their high levels of prejudice (which they tend to 
turn on Jews, Catholics, homosexuals, Communists and splinter-groups within their own 
movements with equal vehemence), authoritarian people are rigidly moralistic, intolerant of 
ambiguity and deviance, and obsessively interested in other people’s sex lives. They feel 
threatened by powerful external forces and are much given to conspiracy theories.9
Allport suggested that what prejudiced people do in relation to groups they 
dislike may not be directly related to what they think or feel about them, but most negative 
attitudes eventually express themselves in some sort of action. Historically, outbreaks of 
persecution of homosexuals, or members of national, racial or ethnic out-groups, are 
relatively common, but 400 years have passed since the last outbreak of gross persecution on 
the basis of gender. 
While historians continue to debate the political, economic and social antecedents of 
the great witchhunts, most scholars agree that the publication of the Malleus Malificarum in 
1486 was the spark that ignited the most sustained outbreak of misogyny in human history. 
Through the demonisation of women, the priests who authored that celebrated encyclopaedia 
of witchcraft created a scapegoat for the discontents of their age and a justification for the 
persecutions that followed. Their claim, ‘All witchcraft is caused by carnal lust which is in 
women insatiable’,10 is an example of stereotyping by gender that bears a remarkable 
resemblance to the contemporary feminist slogan, ‘All men are rapists’. Also, like the witch-
hunters’ demonisation of women, the feminists’ demonisation of men had far-reaching 
consequences.
One consequence was the beatification of women. If men were evil and bad, women 
were virtuous and good. Karl Jung would have explained it this way: there is good and bad in
everyone, but, when radical feminists blamed men for all the evil in the world they split their 
essential selves. Then, having disowned the bad, all they had left for their own self-images 
was unadulterated good.
With the demonisation of men, the distinction made by women’s liberationists 
between ‘men we like’ and ‘male chauvinist pigs’ was abolished. All men were predatory 
bastards. They ceased to appear on the pages of Broadsheet, they were no longer welcome at 
feminist events and their responsibility for the oppression of women was subject to further 
detailed analysis.
The outcome was a ‘political critique of the institution and ideology of heterosexuality as a 
cornerstone of male supremacy’ that portrayed sexual violence as ‘a constant threat and 
reminder of the power of men over women’, and ‘an ultimate expression of female 
oppression in a patriarchal society’.11 
The ramifications of this analysis extended from the political to the personal. In the early 
‘70s, feminist leaders protested that they were not bra-burning, man-hating lesbians, and 
declared that what some women did with other women in the privacy of their own bedrooms 
was their own business. Then, under the influence of radical feminist theory, what women did
in their own bedrooms, and with whom, became issues of central importance. As the decade 
progressed, and committed feminists analysed their relationships in terms of male supremacy 
and female oppression, many turned the slogan ‘Feminism is the theory - lesbianism is the 
practice’ into a personal reality.12
American Charlotte Bunch (who, five years earlier, had been Charlotte Bunch-
Weeks, a married heterosexual) visited New Zealand for the second United Women’s 
Convention in 1975, and discussed her lesbianism in an interview with Broadsheet:
...the best way for a woman to understand herself... is through a lesbian identity. Until
society changes its attitudes, to say you are celibate identifies you with 
heterosexuality. I have good friends who are heterosexual ... but it is hard to 
understand since I find lesbianism so much more liberating for a woman.13
In Broadsheet, many New Zealand women shared their reasons for becoming lesbians. While
the opportunity to acknowledge a sexual or romantic preference, escape an unhappy 
marriage, overcome loneliness, rebel against a rigid upbringing or indulge in sexual 
experimentation were often contributing factors, to some feminists the ascetic idealism 
espoused by Charlotte Bunch was the primary attraction. Like nuns in an age of faith, they 
depicted their lesbianism as a vocational choice that freed them to work for the greater good, 
unfettered by the distractions, temptations and obligations of a relationship with the opposite 
sex. From their vantage point on the moral high-ground, they pitied their heterosexual sisters.
In the popular radical feminist book of the ‘70s Lesbian Nation, Jill Johnston wrote: ‘All 
women are lesbians, except those who don’t know it.’ 
(In view of the current climate of sexual politics, readers may wonder about the right 
of this heterosexual to write about lesbian history. While it is true that lesbian contributions 
to services for women and children in New Zealand have been much celebrated in lesbian-
feminist circles, it is equally true that wider debate has been discouraged. At women’s 
gatherings, when radical feminists introduce themselves with statements like, ‘I’m a lesbian - 
does anyone have a problem with that?’, they convey that, while for some lesbians it is de 
rigueur to make an issue of their gender identity, it is unacceptable for heterosexuals to do so.
None-the-less, at the risk of being labelled as having ‘a problem’, I have come to the view 
that any study of child sexual abuse in New Zealand would be incomplete without an account
of the influence of lesbian-feminist politics and personalities.)
Throughout the ‘70s, a major target of radical feminist criticism was the patriarchal family. In
Broadsheet, the child rearing book most frequently cited was Shulamith Firestone’s The 
Dialectic of Sex. Like her sister theorists, Firestone regarded sexual oppression as a 
cornerstone of political oppression, and the patriarchal family as the cornerstone of the 
patriarchal society. Her solution was radical in the extreme: she called for the abolition of the 
family. In practice, this feminist utopia proved elusive. Though most feminist mothers 
interviewed by Broadsheet had thrown off the theoretical oppression of the patriarchal 
family, all they had replaced it with was the practical oppression of solo motherhood. 
On the outskirts of feminism, women who had accepted the traditional role of wife 
and mother without question reconsidered their options. But when they reflected on the 
changing attitudes of men towards child care, housework and family decision-making, and 
weighed the theory of patriarchal oppression against the practical advantages of raising 
children in a two-parent family, most mainstream women concluded that having a long-term 
relationship with the father of their children was the best option.
Meanwhile, at the core of feminism, the cauldron of debate congealed into dogma. No
one dared ask why the Goddess had made heterosexual intercourse a necessary and 
pleasurable aspect of human reproduction, no one dared suggest there were decent men in the
world for whom the label ‘rapist’ was as ridiculous as it was insulting and no one dared 
express a preference for the early-’70s ‘strong, successful, self-reliant’ feminist over the late-
’70s ‘weak and oppressed victim’. As Sandra Coney noted in a 1978 Broadsheet column, 
anyone who questioned the new feminist orthodoxy (or any of its more-oppressed-than-thou 
factions) laid herself open to invective, rejection and accusations of complicity in ‘the anti-
woman backlash’.14 
By the end of the ‘70s, disillusioned heterosexuals were abandoning the women’s 
liberation movement in droves, leaving lesbian radicals (and a few heterosexual radicals) in 
control of the feminist high ground. Women who would have been regarded as extremists in 
the early ‘70s (by their own unreconstructed selves as well as by the rest of society) became, 
in the ‘80s, the core theorists and spokespeople of the movement. Among their number were 
two energetic, intelligent women who took the feminist analysis of rape from the political to 
the personal, and on to the professional. Both began the ‘70s as heterosexual wives and 
mothers and ended it as lesbian-feminist psychologists. They were Hilary Haines and Miriam
Jackson. 
Haines and Jackson encountered women’s liberation at Auckland University in the 
early ‘70s. They joined feminist consciousness-raising groups, became members of the 
Broadsheet collective, and reoriented their sexuality and ended their marriages during their 
student years. Jackson also fought one of her first political campaigns. ‘I drew graphs 
showing that we were turning people away from the [university] creche,’ she recalled in 
1987. ‘They were quite distorted graphs, but successful politically in terms of getting an 
extension on the creche.’15 Using distorted statistics for political ends would bring Jackson 
further success in the years ahead [see Ch.2.II].
Miriam Jackson had five children of her own, but her career path did not include working 
with a range of normal children. Instead, she laid the groundwork for her later expertise in 
child sexual abuse by working with rapists and their victims as a Justice Department 
psychologist. She also studied overseas research, conducted surveys, analysed the results, 
gave lectures, contributed to conferences and wrote articles. Anger was her driving force. 
‘This anger gave me the energy to gather up society’s dirty washing (male violence against 
women) and hang it out for the people to see and do something about,’ she wrote in 1982.16  
To feminist activists, rape statistics were an area where radical ideals and everyday reality 
clashed head-on. Despite a vigorous ‘believe the victim’ campaign and the establishment of 
rape crisis centres nationwide, rape continued to constitute less than 0.5 percent of recorded 
crime in New Zealand.17 Also, despite all the rhetoric about white, middle-class men being 
the chief perpetrators and beneficiaries of patriarchal privilege through rape and the threat of 
rape, those convicted of rape were usually poor men from racial minorities. Through all the 
analyses and agitation of the ‘70s, the men who held the reins of power had gone on holding 
the reins of power. A few minor reforms aside, nothing that feminists said or did had make 
any difference. In the light of this outcome, the theorists who argued that all men were 
rapists, and the rape crisis workers whose services lacked the anticipated demand, were faced
with a dilemma: they could admit that their extravagant claims about the prevalence of rape 
and the identity of the rapists were wrong, or they could redefine the problem and repackage 
the statistics to produce the results they wanted. In the decade ahead, many enterprising 
feminists chose the latter option.
In most respects the antithesis of ‘70s feminism was ‘70s religious conservatism. 
Conservatives favoured a God-fearing society in which men ruled the world and women 
knew their place. They were opposed to abortion, homosexuality, pornography, sex 
education, extra-marital sex and working mothers. All that authoritarian conservatives 
appeared to have in common with authoritarian feminists was an intense interest in what 
people did in the privacy of their own bedrooms and a tight-lipped disappointment with the 
creator for making heterosexual intercourse necessary for the continuation of the species. 
During the permissive ‘60s the protests of religious conservatives were trampled underfoot in
the headlong communal rush to enjoy the fruits of the sexual revolution. But, during the ‘70s,
conservatives returned to the public arena with a vengeance.18
Patricia Bartlett, ex-nun and indefatigable anti-pornography activist, founded the 
Society for the Promotion of Community Standards in 1970, and went on to picket, petition, 
survey, review, debate and lobby with unrelenting vigour but little success for the next 25 
years. Another conservative movement of the ‘70s, the Society for the Protection of the 
Unborn Child, persuaded parliament to tighten the laws on legalised abortion. But, despite 
this success, religious conservatism ended the decade still struggling to be taken seriously in 
the face of ongoing criticism from civil libertarians over issues of censorship, and ridicule 
from the general public for its busybody prurience.
The most spectacularly successful social force of the 1970s, the child protection movement, 
began early in the previous decade. In a 1962 paper, Denver paediatrician Henry Kempe 
coined the term ‘the battered-child syndrome’ to remind doctors that not all childhood 
injuries were accidental. Kempe claimed that this ‘unrecognised trauma’ was ‘a frequent 
cause of permanent injury or death’, and ‘one of the most serious concerns facing society’.19 
Henry Kempe was a man of vision, determination and charisma. Between the 
publication of his ground-breaking paper in 1962 and the first edition of The Battered Child 
in 1967, he persuaded all 50 American states to pass child-abuse reporting laws. The 
following year, two articles in scholarly journals cast doubt on his alarmist claims but failed 
to slow his momentum. Following the first article (which reported that only a minority of 
physically ill-treated children showed frank symptoms of the battered-child syndrome), 
Kempe expanded his frontiers and renamed his territory ‘child abuse’. The second article 
(which concluded that sensational reports had greatly exaggerated the importance of the 
problem) appears to have been ignored.20
In the second edition of The Battered Child (1974) Kempe noted that reports of 
suspected child abuse in New York city had escalated from 400 in 1966 to 10,000 in 1972. 
‘Adequate demographic data which provide up-to-date evidence of the true incidence of 
significant child abuse in the United States is not available,’ he added.
It should not have been insurmountably difficult for Henry Kempe to conduct his own
prevalence survey. After all, it was the visible, and therefore presumably measurable, 
evidence of bleeding, bruising, broken bones and death that had enabled him to bring the 
problem to public attention in the first place. Perhaps he was discouraged by the official 
figures for childhood deaths due to violence in the United States, which, despite the 
escalating reporting rate, had stayed constant at 1000 per year in 1969, 1970 and 1971. In a 
population of 250 million, 1000 deaths per year is not a headline-grabbing figure. It is not a 
figure likely to inspire decision-makers to allocate more resources to child protection. In fact,
the constancy of the figure could lead politicians to wonder whether the extra resources 
allocated thus far were serving any useful purpose. 
But while the prevalence of non-accidental childhood injuries in the United States remained 
uninvestigated, New Zealand Department of Social Welfare researchers analysed information
on all cases of suspected or alleged child abuse brought to the attention of the Child Welfare 
Division of the Department in 1967. Inevitably, some cases would have been concealed, 
some would have been handled by other agencies and some would not have been recognised. 
But, given New Zealand’s relatively homogenous population of 2.75 million, the results were
probably as reliable as any that could have been obtained anywhere in the world. The 
researchers concluded:
...child abuse is not a problem of major social importance in New Zealand. During the
survey year fewer than 3 children in every 10,000 in the 0-16 age group came to the 
attention of the Child Welfare Division for incidents in which there was evidence of 
abuse. Even for the high risk (under 1 year old) group the incidence was only 4.5 per 
10,000 children. Further, the bulk of incidents... involved only relatively minor 
injuries, and of the 255 abused children only 44 were hospitalised as a consequence of
abuse. By way of comparison, in the same year 2,401 children in the 0-14 age group 
were admitted to hospital suffering from the effects of road accidents and a further 
2,131 from accidental poisonings in the home.21
This finding may have been good news for New Zealand children. But scientific reality is one
thing and social reality is something else again, and the social reality was that child abuse 
was an idea whose time had come. 
In the 19th century, Victorian reformers blamed what they called ‘cruelty to children’ on the 
poverty and ignorance of the lower classes, and favoured removing needy children to 
orphanages and industrial schools. But, during the first half of the 20th century, as reformers 
realised that even the poorest families could do a better job of raising their own children than 
institutions, society became less inclined to police needy families, and more inclined to 
support them. And so the occupation of social worker was born. 
In the 1960s, Henry Kempe put a new spin on the old problem by suggesting that 
child abuse was a medical and law-enforcement issue, and that children could be mistreated 
by individuals from any walk of life.22 Through this approach Kempe created a new research 
frontier where medical, psychiatric and statistical knowledge could be found and put to use. 
Almost overnight, he raised the status of people who worked with ill-treated children to 
undreamt-of heights and new recruits flocked to meet the challenge. 
Using arguments couched in the trendy language of civil rights, Kempe campaigned for 
statutory changes allowing social workers to remove ‘at risk’ children from their families. 
His claim that the rights of children to be protected from abuse outweighed the rights of 
parents to raise their offspring as they saw fit23 encouraged social workers to regard parents 
as selfish oppressors, and professionals as selfless carers. Though it was no more than 
linguistic legerdemain, Kempe’s claim set the pendulum of child protection swinging away 
from supporting needy families, and back towards policing them.
Also, by presenting child abuse as an illness and a crime, Kempe kept the social issues that 
normally divide liberals and conservatives off the political agenda. Vice-President Mondale 
promoted Kempe’s Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act with slogans like ‘This is a 
political problem, not a poverty problem’, and ‘Not even Richard Nixon is in favour of child 
abuse!’. In 1974 ‘the Mondale Act’ (which provided federal child-protection funds only to 
states with mandatory child-abuse reporting laws)24 was passed almost unanimously. The 
same year the National Centre on Child Abuse and Neglect was established with an annual 
budget of $19 million.
Having conquered the United States, Henry Kempe went on to conquer the world. In 
1976, the First International Congress on Child Abuse and Neglect was held within the 
facilities of WHO in Geneva.
A mood of heady excitement pervaded the congress. ‘There has been an explosion of 
professional and public interest’, a delegate reported. ‘The battered child has moved from the 
back pages of professional journals to the front pages of mass circulation newspapers. Daily, 
there are additional news articles, television and radio programmes and community meetings,
not to mention professional conferences, on the subject.’25  
‘This could be the start of something big,’ observed another delegate.
The momentum continued with the establishment of the journal Child Abuse and Neglect in 
1977. But, by the time the second International Congress was held in London in 1978, change
was in the wind. 
Along with the successes (more abuse reports, more funding, more media attention) 
had come problems. From 1976, U.S. statistics were collected annually by the American 
Humane Association. These showed that the astronomical rise in suspected child abuse cases 
was accompanied by an equally astronomical rise in false allegations26. To make matters 
worse, the number of children who died at the hands of caregivers each year stayed virtually 
constant. These points did not go unnoticed by the media. Some articles damned child 
protection workers for tearing innocent families apart, others damned them for leaving guilty 
families intact. 
By the late ‘70s the child protection movement was also drawing the wrath of 
feminists and religious conservatives. Feminists took exception to the claim that most 
physical child abuse was perpetrated by women (and, all too often, by poor women from 
racial minorities); while religious conservatives took exception to the movement’s wish to 
deny parents their divine right to hit their own children. 
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